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Abstract
This paper builds a baseline two-country model of real and monetary transmission in
the presence of optimal international price discrimination by ﬁrms. Distributing traded goods
to consumers requires nontradables, intensive in local labor. Because of distributive trade
the price elasticity of demand depends on country-speciﬁc shocks to productivity and the
exchange rate. Hence, within limits dictated by the possibility of arbitrage, proﬁt-maximizing
monopolistic ﬁrms drive a wedge between prices across countries at both wholesale and
retail level. Optimal pricing thus results in possibly large deviations from the law of one
price and incomplete pass-through on import prices. Consistent with the received wisdom
on international transmission, nominal and real depreciations worsens the terms of trade.
In general, the nominal and real exchange rate are more volatile than fundamentals, and
large movements in the international prices translate into small changes in consumption,
employment and the price level. Finally, we provide an example showing that international
policy cooperation may be redundant even when asset trading is ruled out, despite incomplete
pass-through and less than optimal risk sharing.
JEL classiﬁcation: F3, F4.





3. Pricing-to-market and incomplete pass-through ...................................... 14
3.1 Firms’optimizationandoptimalpricediscrimination.............................15
3.2 Optimal pricing in the presence of arbitrage between retail and wholesale markets . 17
3.3 Exchangeratepass-through ....................................................19




5. Equilibrium under alternative speciﬁcationsoftheassetmarket.......................26
5.1 Nominalandrealexchangerate .................................................28
5.2 T ermsoftrade..................................................................29
5.3 RealGDPandpricele vels ......................................................29





∗University of Rome III, Yale University and CEPR.
∗∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction
1
One of the most striking stylized facts of the international economy is the magnitude
of cross-border price differentials. First, even in regions with the longest track record of free
trade, the empirical evidence shows that the law of one price fails to hold for most types
of goods and services.
2 Although this law also fails to hold within national boundaries, the
deviations are much more dramatic at theinternational level — which has led some researchers
to posit a speciﬁc ‘border effect’ (i.e. the effect of switching currencies across jurisdictions)
on the prices of tradables.
3 Second, prices seem to respond only mildly, if at all, to changes in
the nominal exchange rate.
4 To the extent that incomplete exchange rate pass-through is due to
destination-speciﬁc markup adjustment by ﬁrms with market power, this is evidence of market
segmentation. As ﬁrms ‘price-to-market’ (henceforth PTM), buyers across national markets
face systematically different prices for otherwise identical goods.
5
While a deeper understanding of these facts is an exciting challenge to microeconomic
research, the evidence of large international price discrepancies raises important
macroeconomic issues. Namely, cross-border relative price adjustments are at the core of the
conventional wisdom on international transmission, exempliﬁed by the enduring contributions
1 TWe thank Pierpaolo Benigno, Don Davis, Marguerita Duarte, Charles Engel, Raffaela Giordano, Pierre
Gourinchas, Dale Henderson, Sylvain Leduc, Maurice Obstfeld, Patrizio Pagano, Paolo Pesenti, Morten Ravn,
Chris Sims and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, University of California at Berkeley and Santa Cruz,
Columbia University, Cornell University, Insead, the International Monetary Fund, the International Research
Forum on Monetary Policy at the European Central Bank, the 2002 NBER Summer Institute, the New York Fed,
New York University, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, Yale University, and the 2001 meeting
of the SED for helpful comments. Corsetti’s work on this paper is part of a research network on ‘The Analysis
of International Capital Markets: Understanding Europe’s Role in the Global Economy’, funded by the European
Commission under the Research Training Network Programme (Contract No. HPRN-CT-1999-00067). The
views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reﬂect the position of the Bank of Italy or
any other institution with which the authors are afﬁliated.
2 See Rogoff [1996] for an excellent survey on the evidence on the failure of the law of one price. In his
analysis of US exchange rate movements, using both consumers and producers price indices, Engel [1999] ﬁnds
that a great deal of the amount of deviations from purchasing power parity are due to a failure of the law of one
price for internationally traded goods.
3 Engel and Rogers [1996] ﬁnd that nominal currency movements appear to be important determinants of
international price discrepancies.
4 Exchange rate pass-through, quite low for consumer prices, is far from complete also for international
prices. According to the evidence surveyed by Goldberg and Knetter [1997], 1/2 is the median fraction by which
exporters to the US offset a dollar appreciation by lowering their export prices.
5 Krugman[1987]labeledthephenomenonofexchange-rate-inducedpricediscrimination‘pricing-to-market’.
Overall, the average degree of pricing-to-market found by Marston’s[1990] classic study of Japanese industriesis
in the neighborhood of 50 percent. Similar ﬁndings are in Knetter [1989, 1993] and Gagnon and Knetter [1995].8
ofFriedman[1953]andMundell [1960]. Ifﬁrmsoptimallyinsulatelocalpricesfrom exchange
rate movements, the exchange rate may have a lesser impact on the relative prices of domestic
and foreign goods, in relation to what is implied by the received view. For instance, Krugman
[1989] notes that, in the presence of deviations from the law of one price and incomplete
pass-through, large swings in the exchange rate may bring about only negligeable changes in
the equilibrium allocation. But what are the overall implications of endogenous PTM for the
international transmission? Does international market segmentation justify pessimism about
the allocative role of exchange rate movements? Does it create policy spillovers that call for
for international cooperation in policy design?
To address these issues, we build a general-equilibrium two-country modelwith nominal
wage rigidities and monopolistic competition in production, in which upstream ﬁrms with
monopoly power optimally charge different prices to competitive retailers situated in different
locations. What makes the elasticity of demand differ across markets is the need for
local-input-intensive distribution services.
6 We show that this way of modelling vertical
relationships among ﬁrms located in different markets is effective in bringing the model more
closely into line with key stylized facts of the international economy and leads to a number of
novel results.
First, deviations from the law of one price at both wholesale and retail levels in our
model derive endogenously from optimal pricing by monopolistic ﬁrms. Different from most
contributions in the literature, we solve the ﬁrms’ problem under the constraint that prices
should not provide opportunities for arbitrage across market locations. Secondly, since the
price elasticity of export demand is increasing in the wholesale price and non-linear in the
exchange rate, optimal international price discrimination leads to incomplete exchange rate
pass-through. Third, despite low pass-through, a nominal depreciation can worsen the terms
of trade — consistent with the received wisdom about international transmission and the
possibility of expenditure-switching effects. Furthermore, nominal and real exchange rates are
positively correlated in equilibrium. Fourth, the exchange rate tends to be more volatile than
6 To enhance comparison with the literature our open economy model with endogenous price discrimination
builds on the analytical framework of Corsetti and Pesenti [2001a,b] and Obstfeld and Rogoff [1995, 2000]. The
speciﬁcation of consumption preferences in these models is such that terms-of-trade movements in response
to worldwide shocks can be sufﬁcient to generate optimal risk-sharing: introducing Arrow-Debreu securities
would not change the equilibrium allocation. This is no longer the case when we allow for distributive trade: no
equilibrium with trade in international bonds can lead to optimal risk sharing — not even when nominal rigidities
and monopoly power distortions are removed.9
fundamentals. However, because of low equilibrium pass-through, large movements in the
nominal and real exchange rates translates into small changes in consumption, employment
and price levels. Finally, we provide an example showing that, despite segmentation of
both the assets and the goods markets, monetary rules targeting the domestic output gap are
(constrained-) optimal, and there are no gains from international policy cooperation.
Distribution services are traditionally invoked as a key reason for the failure of
Purchasing Power Parity (henceforth PPP).
7 Dornbusch [1989], for instance, suggests that
these services may account for his ﬁnding that the price of an identical consumption basket
is higher in high-income economies than in low-income ones. Overall, distributive trade
accounts for an important share of the retail price of consumption goods: for the US, including
wholesale and retail services, marketing, advertisement and local transportation, the average
distribution margin is as high as 50 percent (see Burstein, Neves and Rebelo [2000]).
Strong evidence of the importance of distribution services in accounting for international
price discrimination is presented by Goldberg and Verboven [2001], based on comprehensive
and detailed data for automobile prices in ﬁve European countries. According to their
estimates, a 1 per cent change in the nominal exchange rate induces a 0.46 per cent adjustment
in the export prices in exporter currency (i.e., equivalent to a 0.54 pass-through coefﬁcient). Of
this, between 0.37 and 0.39 per cent can be attributed to a change in local wages (i.e., nominal
wages in the destination country).
8
In recent years, a number of contributions have included distributive trade in open macro
models in order to account for the very low exchange rate pass-through at the consumer
price level.
9 Yet, this literature has not analyzed market segmentation resulting from the
vertical interaction among monopolistic producers and retailers, nor the implications of such
interaction for international transmission and policy design. This is precisely the goal of this
paper.
7 Recentliteraturehasexploredtheroleofbarrierstotradeandtransportationcosts, butwithoutlinkingthem
explicitly to international price discrimination. See Obstfeld and Rogoff [2001] on the role of transportation costs
in explaining major puzzles in international ﬁnance, and the evidence in Parsley and Wei [2000] on transportation
costs and the border effect.
8 Goldberg and Verboven [2001] estimate that local costs account for up to 35 per cent of the price of a car,
mainly due to distribution services provided by local dealers.
9 Erceg and Levin [1995], McCallum and Nelson [1999], and Burstein, Neves and Rebelo [2000] assume
that distribution requires local inputs, focusing on the case of perfect competition in the goods market.10
By modelling vertical relationships between ﬁrms located in different national markets,
we take a different approach from the recent contributions that view market segmentation as a
direct implication of price rigidities. In this literature, foreign exporters preset consumer prices
in local currency.
10 One problem with this class of models is that, although they do account
for price differences across markets and the border effect, they imply that an exchange rate
depreciation should improve a country’s terms of trade. Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000a] however
ﬁnd evidence at odds with such prediction: in the data, exchange rate depreciations tend to be
associated with a worsening of the terms of trade, as in the conventional wisdom.
11
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses
optimal pricing by monopolistic ﬁrms facing country-speciﬁc demand elasticities. Section
4 analyzes the novel features of the equilibrium with endogenously segmented markets,
highlighting the link between exchange rate determination and relative prices. Section 5
derives a set of predictions that are broadly consistent with the main stylized facts on
international prices. Section 6 looks at the limiting case of no monopoly power in the goods
market and characterizes the optimal monetary policy, showing that in equilibrium there are
no international policy spillovers that would call for international policy cooperation. Section
7 concludes.
2. The model
The world economy consists of two countries of equal size, H and F. Each country is
specialized in one type of tradable good, produced in a number of varieties or brands deﬁned
over a continuum of unit mass. Brands of tradable goods are indexed by h ∈ [0,1] in the Home
country and f ∈ [0,1] in the Foreign country. In addition, each country produces an array of
differentiated nontradable goods, indexed by n ∈ [0,1].Nontraded goods are either consumed
or used to make intermediate tradable goods h and f available to domestic consumers.
10 An incomplete list of papers assuming local currency prices includes Betts and Devereux [2000], Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan [2000], Devereux and Engel [2000], and Kollman [1997], among others (see Lane [2001]
and Engel [2002] for a survey of the literature, and Corsetti and Pesenti [2001b] for a generalization of this
approach). Early contributions simply assumed that foreign exporters quote prices in local currency. Recent
worksbyBacchettaandvanWincoop[2000], Corsetti andPesenti [2002]andDevereuxandEngel [2001] analyze
the problem of producers who can choose whether to preset prices in domestic currency only or in both domestic
and foreign currencies.
11 Another approach to modelling price discrimination (clearly complementary to ours) consists of introduc-
ing non-constant elasticity preferences — see the recent work by Bergin and Feenstra [2001] on the persistence
of real exchange rates following monetary shocks.11
Firms producing tradable and nontradable goods are monopolistic suppliers of one brand
of goods only. These ﬁrms employ differentiated domestic labor inputs in a continuum of unit
mass. Each worker occupies a point in this continuum, and acts as a monopolistic supplier of
a differentiated type of labor input to all ﬁrms in the domestic economy. Households/workers
are indexed by j ∈ [0,1] in the Home country and j∗ ∈ [0,1] in the Foreign country.
Firms operating in the distribution sector, by contrast, are assumed to operate under perfect
competition.
12 They buy tradable goods and distribute them to consumers using nontraded
goods as the only input in production.
In our baseline model, we allow for nominal rigidities by assuming that workers and
ﬁrms agree on the nominal wage rate one period in advance.
13 In what follows, we describe
our set up focusing on the Home country, with the understanding that similar expressions
also characterize the Foreign economy — whereas variables referred to Foreign ﬁrms and
households are marked with an asterisk.
Technology
Let Y (h) denote total output of a differentiated tradable good h,a n dL(h,j) the demand
for labor input of type j by the producer of good h. By the same token, Y (n) denotes total
production of a differentiated nontradable good n,a n dL(n,j) the corresponding demand



















where φ is the elasticity of substitution among labor inputs, which is the same across
sectors, and Z denotes stochastic productivity parameters, which are sector-speciﬁc. Similar
expressions hold for ﬁrms in the Foreign country, whereas the elasticity of substitution is also
φ, but the productivity shocks are not necessarily symmetric.
12 Due to this assumption, we note from the start that the equilibrium allocation studied below would be
identical in a vertically integrated economy, where exporters with monopoly power own local retailers.
13 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2001] and Smets and Wouters [2001] are recent structural models
providing convincing evidence that price stickiness induced by wage stickiness is an important determinant of
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Here we abstract from issues in inﬂation dynamics that could be analyzed, for
instance, by assuming Calvo-style adjustment of prices or wages. See Kollman [1997] and Chari et al. [2000]
among others.12
Our speciﬁcation of the distribution sector is in the spirit of the matter-of-fact remark by
Tirole([1995], page175)that “production and retailing are complements, and consumersoften
consume them in ﬁxed proportions”. As in Erceg and Levin [1995] and Burstein, Neves and
Rebelo [2000], we thus assume that bringing one unit of traded goods to consumers requires η










We note here that the Dixit-Stiglitz index above also applies to the consumption of
differentiated nontraded goods, speciﬁed in the next subsection. In equilibrium, then, the
basket of nontraded goods required to distribute tradable goods to consumers will have the





















where β < 1 is the discount rate and the instantaneous utility is a function of a consumption
index C(j),t ob ed e ﬁned below, real balances M (j)/P, and labor effort `(j). Instantaneous
utility is state-dependent, as we potentially allow for velocity shocks in the form of a
stochastically varying utility of real balances, and shocks to the disutility of labor.
Households consume all types of (domestically-produced) nontraded goods, and both
types of traded goods. So Ct(n,j) is consumption of brand n of Home nontraded good by
agent j at time t; Ct(h,j) and Ct(f,j) are the same agent’s consumption of Home brand h and
Foreign brand f. For each type of good, we assume that one brand is an imperfect substitute
for all other brands, with constant elasticity of substitution θ > 1. Consumption of Home and
14 For simplicity, we do not distinguish between nontradable consumption goods, which directly enter the
agents’ utility, and nontraded distribution services, which are jointly consumed with traded goods. This distinc-
tion may however be important in more empirically oriented studies (e.g., see MacDonald and Ricci [2001]). By
the same token, we ignore distribution costs incurred in the non-traded good market, as these can be accounted
for by varying the level of productivity in the nontradable sector.13


































γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ . (6)
As in Corsetti and Pesenti [2001a], the parameters describing consumption preferences are the
same in the Home and Foreign country.
15
Price indexes
Let pt(h) and p∗
t(h) denote the retail price of brand h expressed in the Home and Foreign




















The price indexes PN,t,P ∗
N,t,P F,t and P∗
F,t, are analogously deﬁned. The utility-based price

































Household budget constraints and asset markets
Home agents hold Home currency M, two international bonds, BH and BF, respectively
denominated in Home and Foreign currency, and a well-diversiﬁed portfolio of domestic
equities. They earn labor income W` and pay non-distortionary (lump-sum) net taxes T,
15 Consistent with the assumption that each country specializes in the production of a single type of traded
good, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different countries (set equal to one) is below the
elasticity of substitution among goods produced in one country (θ > 1).14
denominated in Home currency. The individual ﬂow budget constraint for agent j in the Home
country is:
16










Wt(j)`t(j) − Tt(j) − PH,tCH,t(j) − PF,tCF,t(j) − PN,tCN,t(j)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as Home currency per unit of Foreign
currency; it and i∗
t are the nominal yields in Home and Foreign currency, paid at the beginning




Π(n,j)dn is the agent’s share of
proﬁts from all ﬁrms h and n in the economy.
The international bonds are assumed to be in zero net-supply, so that in the aggregate
BH,t = −B∗
H,t and BF,t = −B∗
F,t.
Government budget constraint and policy instruments
The government budget constraint in the Home country is:
Z 1
0
[Mt(j) − Mt−1(j)]dj +
Z 1
0
Tt(j)dj =0 . (10)
We abstract from government spending, and seigniorage revenue is rebated to households in










Given the time path of µ, there is a corresponding sequence of Home nominal interest rates.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the government affects the stock of Home monetary
assets by controlling the short-term rate it+1: Home monetary easing at time t l e a d i n gt oa
lower it+1 is associated with a higher µt.
17
3. Pricing-to-market and incomplete pass-through
16 The notation conventions follow Obstfeld and Rogoff [1996, ch.10]. Speciﬁcally, Mt(j) denotes agent
j’s nominal balances accumulated during period t and carried over into period t +1 , while BH,t(j) and BF,t(j)
denote agent j’s bonds accumulated during period t − 1 and carried over into period t.
17 With logarithmic utility, in equilibrium µt is equal to nominal spending PtCt.15
3.1 Firms’ optimization and optimal price discrimination
International price discrimination is a key feature of the international economy captured
by our model. In what follows we show that, even if Home and Foreign consumers have
identical constant-elasticity preferences for consumption, the need for distribution services
intensive in local nontraded goods implies that the elasticity of demand for the h (f)b r a n d
at wholesale level is not generally the same across markets. Firms will thus want to charge
different prices at Home and in the Foreign country. We will focus our analysis on Home ﬁrms
— optimal pricing by Foreign ﬁrms can be easily derived from it.
Consider ﬁrst the optimal pricing problem faced by ﬁrms producing nontradables for the























Note that nominal wage rigidities do not translate into price rigidities: the price of the
nontraded good pt(n) in fact moves inversely with productivity in the sector.
Now, let pt(h) denote the price of brand h e x p r e s s e di nt h eH o m ec u r r e n c y ,a tproducer
level. With a competitive distribution sector, the consumer price of good h is simply
pt(h)=pt(h)+ηPN,t. (14)
In the case of ﬁrms producing tradables, “pricing to market” derives endogenously from the
solution to the problem of the Home representative ﬁrm in the sector:





























































Unlike the case of nontraded goods (13), in this case the markups charged by the Home ﬁrms
include a state-contingent component (in brackets in the above expressions) that varies as a
function of productivity shocks. In the export market, the markup also responds to monetary
innovations (affecting the exchange rate) and relative wages.
In general, the optimal wholesale price of tradable goods will not obey the law of one
price (¯ pt(h) 6= Et¯ p∗
t(h)). With η > 0, the elasticity of the demand for the Home goods
as perceived by the upstream monopolist will be different at Home and abroad, reﬂecting
any asymmetry in relative productivity and/or relative wages. Home monopolistic ﬁrms take
account of the implications of distributive trade on the demand elasticity for their product, and
ﬁnd it optimal to charge different prices to ﬁr m sd i s t r i b u t i n gi nt h eH o m ea n di nt h eF o r e i g n
market.
In the Home market the price elasticity of the demand for the good h depends on relative




















In the export market the price elasticity of the demand for the good h depends on productivity































Observe that the price elasticity of export demand is non linear in the exchange rate: a
relatively appreciated Home currency (a low Et) corresponds to a relatively large price17
elasticity. Furthermore, it is increasing in the wholesale price — as shown by the literature on
international trade, this is a sufﬁcient condition for incomplete exchange-rate pass-through.
18
Note also that the above expressions are monotonic functions of the distribution margin,
deﬁned as the share of distributive trade in the consumer price of the good h. This margin is
ηP ∗
N,t/p∗
t(h) in the export market and ηPN,t/pt(h) in the domestic market. In either market, the
higher the distribution margin, the lower the price elasticity.
3.2 Optimal pricing in the presence of arbitrage between retail and wholesale markets
While charging (17) and (18) would maximize ﬁrms’ proﬁts, arbitrage in the goods
market may prevent optimal price discrimination between domestic and foreign dealers.
19 We
now analyze ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions allowing for the possibility of arbitrage across
wholesale and retail markets.
Consider the consumer price of the good h in both markets, calculated adding the
distribution costs (ηPN and η∗P∗

































If the representative Home ﬁrm set the wholesale price in the Foreign country above the
consumer price of its own good in the Home country, ﬁrms distributing good h in the Foreign
country would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to buy it from Home retailers rather than in the wholesale
market. This implies that optimal price discrimination is possible only as long as the following











≥ ¯ pt(h) (23)
pt(h)=¯ pt(h)+ηPN,t ≥ Et¯ p
∗
t(h).
18 As far as the elasticity of substitution between the tradable good and the nontradable bundle in the retailer
distribution technology is less than 1, the producer’s price elasticity will be increasing in ¯ p∗(h).
19 We are assuming that markets can be segmented along national lines. In our model this could is easily
justiﬁed with a system of selective and exclusive distribution, in which the manufacturer can choose dealers and
restrain them from reselling to anyone but end-users. We observe here that regulation 123/85 of the European
Commission has allowed these practices in the European Union to some extent (see Goldberg and Verboven
[2001] for the implications of the Regulation in the European car market).18











According to this expression, for given relative nominal marginal costs in the nontraded goods
sector, a large depreciation of the nominal exchange rate could reduce the Home consumer
price of h in Foreign currency below the optimal export price p∗
t(h) — violating the second
inequality above. In that case, arbitrage in the goods market would force the domestic price
and the foreign wholesale price to be set equal: pt(h)=Et¯ p∗
t(h). By the same token, a
large appreciation of the exchange rate could reduce the foreign retail price of h in the Home
currency below the wholesale price at Home. In this case, ruling out arbitrage requires ﬁrms
to set ¯ pt(h)=Etp∗
t(h).
Leaving the characterization of prices when shocks are such that the no-arbitrage
condition is binding to the Appendix, we provide an intuitive account of our main results.
Suppose that to rule out arbitrage Home ﬁrms must set: pt(h)=Et¯ p∗
t(h). Relative to the
optimal prices (17) and (18), Home ﬁrms will now raise ¯ pt(h) above (17) while lowering
¯ p∗
t(h) below (18). As the two prices cannot be set independently, the drop in the markup in
the foreign market is partly offset by a higher markup at home. Even when the no-arbitrage
condition is binding, wholesale prices will still be different in the Home and Foreign markets:
when distribution services are required, the law of one price never holds.
It is easy to verify that, holding (23), it can never be proﬁtable to buy good h at the Home
(Foreign)retail priceandsellitattheForeign(Home)retailpriceafterpayinglocal distribution
costs. We note here that, to the extent that domestic households need local distribution services
even if they buy tradables abroad (i.e. technical assistance), our model endogenously rules out
consumers’ arbitrage across retail markets.
In concluding this section, it is appropriate to discuss brieﬂy our assumption of perfect
competition in the distribution sector. Allowing for monopoly power in the retail sector
would imply double marginalization at consumer prices. In our setup, however, monopolistic
retailers face a constant-elasticity demand, so that their markup over marginal cost would be
constant (the right hand side of (14) would be multiplied by the constant θ
θ−1). Thus, double
marginalization would inﬂuence the level of consumer prices (both (21) and (22) would be
multiplied by θ
θ−1), but not their wholesale counterpart (17) and (18). For this reason, it
would not induce substantial differences in our results on the equilibrium response of prices19
to nominal and real shocks. Assuming monopolistic wholesale suppliers and competitive
distributors is a natural benchmark speciﬁcation for our paper.
3.3 Exchange rate pass-through
In addition to explaining deviations from the law of one price, distribution costs also
have key implications for the optimal degree of exchange rate pass-through. Assume at ﬁrst
that the no-arbitrage condition (24) is satisﬁed as a strict inequality. Other things equal,t h e




















Given wages and productivity, the degree of exchange rate pass-through on import prices is
less than 100 per cent. Pass-through is even lower on consumer prices, as the denominator of
the above expression is augmented by ηP∗
N (which is equivalent to multiplying the second term
in the denominator by θ > 1).
Note that the right-hand side of the above expression is just the inverse of the state-
contingent component of the markup charged by Home ﬁrms in the export market. Clearly,
anythingthatincreasestheHome-exportmarkupwilldampentheeffectoftheexchangerateon
Home-export prices. So a relatively appreciated currency (a low Et), low monopoly power (a
high θ), and a small need for distribution services (a low η) all imply a relatively small markup
in the export market, and a correspondingly high degree of exchange rate pass-through.
Allowing for arbitrage between the retail and the wholesale markets cannot but reinforce
our results. Above we have shown that, when the exchange rate depreciation is large enough,
Home ﬁrms will set the foreign wholesale price equal to the domestic consumer price. To
the extent that shocks cause Home ﬁrms to raise the Home price of their goods, the degree of
pass-through will clearly be even lower than implicit in (18).
As will be clear from the rest of the paper, our model provides a framework to contrast
partial and general equilibrium results. Using our analysis below, it can be easily veriﬁed that
the expression (25) will hold in general equilibrium in the presence of shocks to Home and
Foreign money, and/or to productivity in the Home nontradables and Foreign tradables sectors.
In the general case, (i.e. including all shocks), exchange rate pass-through cannot be captured
in such a simple way — although it will still be incomplete.20
It will also be clear that nominal shocks have real effects only because of nominal
rigidities. Without wage contracts, nominal shocks would not alter relative wages (the
exchange rate and the wage rate would move in the same direction), and pass-through would
be 100 per cent. But even if all prices and wages were fully ﬂexible, price differentials would
still reﬂect productivity differentials across sectors, as well as wage differentials arising from
country-speciﬁc shocks to labor supply. In other words, in our model, ﬁrms’ willingness to
engage in price discrimination across markets is independent of nominal rigidities.
4. Exchange rates and relative prices in general equilibrium
We are now ready to analyze how the exchange rate and the terms of trade respond to
shocks in general equilibrium. We focus on symmetric equilibria within a country (though not
necessarily symmetric across countries): we hereafter drop the indexes j and j∗ and interpret
all variables in per-capita (or aggregate) terms.
Theworldequilibriumischaracterizedasfollows. Giventhestochasticprocessesdriving
monetary stances (µt and µ∗
t) and the shocks to productivity and preferences (all the Z’s, χt,
χ∗
t, κt,a n dκ∗
t), and given the initial holdings of bonds (BH,0 and BF,0) and money (M0 and
M∗
0),f o rt ≥ 0 the equilibrium (symmetric across ﬁrms) is a set of processes for the nominal
exchange rate Et, the Home allocations and prices (lt,C H,t,C F,t,C N,t,M t+1,B H,t+1,B F,t+1,
P H,t, P
∗










F,t, P F,t, P ∗
N,t and W ∗
t ) that (a) satisfy the Home and Foreign consumers’ optimality
conditions, (b) maximize ﬁrms proﬁts, (c) satisfy the market clearing conditions for each asset
and each good, in all the markets where it is traded, and (d) satisfy the resource constraints.
Table 1 presents a subset of equilibrium conditions that completely characterize the
model. In the table, ¯ At+1 denotes Home non-monetary wealth at the beginning of time t +1 ,
i.e.





is similarly deﬁned. Equations (29) state the risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity




Equation (30) is the bond market-clearing equation, while (31) is the current account. These
three equations simultaneously determine the nominal exchange rate and external borrowing.
Employment and consumption in both countries (corresponding to the expressions (32), (34),21
(33) and (35)) can then be derived as a function of exogenous shocks, wages and the nominal
exchange rate. In each country, the nominal wage rate (27) (or (28)) is preset given the joint
distribution of employment, κ (or κ∗) and domestic monetary shocks. In the Appendix, we
show that this economy can have multiple non-stochastic steady states, for (perhaps too) large
values of the distribution margin.
Two observations help understanding the role of distribution costs in our speciﬁcation.




































In our model, movements in the real exchange rate are due both to differences in prices (in
the same currency) of traded goods across countries and to movements of the relative price of
tradables in terms of nontradables.
20 This is in sharp contrast with models adopting a similar
speciﬁcation, but not allowing for distributive trade. By setting η =0 , in fact, there would
be no deviation from the law of one price. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the above
deﬁnition would be constant, and the variability of the real exchange rate would only depend
on the variability of the relative price of nontradables within each country — a prediction that
is inconsistent with the ﬁndings for the US real exchange rate in Engel [1999].










P F,t + ηPN,t
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an expression that is clearly decreasing in η, and equal to 1 for η =0 . Distribution services
reduce the price elasticity of imports demand, below what is implied by Cobb-Douglas
preferences. But by lowering the price elasticity of imports, distributive trade induces larger
price movements for any given quantity change.
20 Since tradables have equal shares in Home and Foreign consumption baskets, terms of trade movements































































































































































































































































To analyze further the properties of our model, it is convenient to proceed at ﬁrst under
the assumption of ﬁnancial autarky. Under this assumption, the exchange rate is implicitly
determined by the balanced trade condition (Et ¯ P∗
H,tC∗
H,t = ¯ PF,tCF,t) as a non-linear function of








































As we will show in the next section, most results under ﬁnancial autarky are qualitatively
identical in our economy with international trade in bonds.
21
In what follows, we linearize the model around a symmetric equilibrium with ZH =
ZF = ZT,Z ∗
N = ZN and equal wage levels κµ across countries. First, we derive the exchange
rate response to nominal and real shocks, focusing on the relative volatility of this variable:
the exchange rate tends to move more than the underlying economic fundamentals. Next,
we show that notwithstanding the low pass-through nominal depreciations tend to worsen the
terms of trade. Finally, we show that nominal and real exchange rates are positively correlated
in equilibrium.
4.1 Exchange rate volatility
Consider ﬁrst the response of the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks, in the form
of an unexpected changes in the ratio of µ to µ∗. In the long run, the nominal exchange rate
moves one-to-one with relative monetary stances. As all prices are ex-ante ﬂexible, money
is neutral: relative wages do not respond to anticipated monetary innovations. The short-run































(b µt − b µ
∗
t). (38)
When the conditions for the existence of multiple steady states derived in the appendix do not
hold, the coefﬁcient multiplying the relative monetary shock in the above equation is always
21 In addition, the static version of our model below is directly comparable to many recent contributions in
open macro that, by assumption or endogenously, rule out current account dynamics (see Corsetti and Pesenti
[2001a], Heathcote and Perri [2000] and Obstfeld and Rogoff [2002]).24
positive and larger than one.
22 Interestingly, a permanent monetary expansion depreciates on
impact the nominal exchange rate by more than its long-run value, generating expectations of
appreciation in the future.
23
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The response to shocks to the traded and the nontraded sector is symmetric: the nominal
exchange rate depreciates with any domestic productivity shock and appreciates with any
Foreign shock. Intuitively, a positive shock to productivity in the Home tradable sector reduces
the wholesale price of the Home goods in the Foreign market. Although the retail price also
falls, increasing Foreign demand, the value of exports drops: for a given value of Home
imports, balanced trade in equilibrium requires a depreciation of the currency (the less elastic
the demand for imports, the larger the rate of depreciation).
By the same token, a positive productivity shock to the Home nontradable sector reduces
unit distribution costs in the Home market, increasing the price elasticity of Home demand for
imports: import prices tend to fall. However, because of falling distribution costs, retail prices
fall by more, boosting Home import demand. Thus, the exchange rate must depreciate to
ensure a zero trade balance. Note that the size of exchange rate movements in response to
productivity shocks is ampliﬁed when η and θ are relatively high.
24
22 T h ea b o v ec o e f ﬁcient depends inversely on the exchange rate elasticity of import and export demand. We
checked numerically that the steady state is unique for a range of values of η
ZT
ZN such that the conditions for
molteplicity in the Appendix do not hold.
23 Note that the above result is not comparable to Dornbusch’s overshooting. Without trade inﬁnancial assets
uncovered interest parity does not hold. Moreover, by deﬁnition of µ, permanent shocks to this variable affect
neither Home nor Foreign interest rates.
24 When the distribution margin is so high that the economy may exhibit multiple equilibria, the response
of the exchange rate to nominal and real shocks may change sign even for equilibria that are in a neighborhood
of the symmetric steady state. Clearly, for values of the parameters close to those that make the sign switch, the
exchange rate becomes extremely volatile.25
4.2 Terms of trade
Considernowthelink betweennominal exchangeratemovements andtheterms oftrade.
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where b Et is given by either (38) or (39), depending on the nature of the shock. Under mild
conditions on the degree of monopoly power and distribution margins, such that η < θ−1,t h e
coefﬁcient of b Et in the above expression is positive. Hence, monetary shocks induce a positive
correlation between the terms of trade and the exchange rate.
The correlation between the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate is also positive
in the presence of real shocks to productivity in the Home tradable sector. As these shocks
unambiguously depreciate the Home currency, they worsen the terms of trade both directly
(second term on the right-hand side of the expression above) and through their effect on E.F o r
this reason, it is possible that shocks to the tradable sector cause the terms of trade to be more
volatile than E.
Conversely, the correlation between E and the terms of trade induced by shocks to
productivity to the Home nontradable sector is not necessarily positive. While unambiguously
depreciating the Home currency, these shocks also have a positive effect on the terms of trade.
This is because, by reducing the cost of distributive trade in the Home market, they raise the
price elasticity of the Home demand for Foreign products. A higher price elasticity tends
to lower the optimal price charged by Foreign wholesalers. While this effect is small for
reasonable values of η/(θ − 1), its presence implies that the volatility of the terms of trade in
response to shocks to nontradables tends to be lower than the volatility of E.
4.3 The real exchange rate
Linearizing the real exchange rate around a symmetric steady state, and focusing on




















´ b Et, (41)26
where b Et isgivenby(38). Since0 < γ < 1, thisexpressionshowsthatmonetaryshocks always
move nominal and real exchange rates in the same direction. Thus, an unexpected monetary
expansion at home will bring about both a nominal and a real depreciation. However, since the
coefﬁcient of b Et in the above expression is less than one, the real exchange rate will move by
less.





































where b Et isgivenby(39). Wehaveseenabovethat, regardlessofthesectorinwhichtheyoccur,
domestic productivity shocks always depreciate the domestic currency in nominal terms. It is
then apparent from the above expressions that they also depreciate it in real terms. Observe
that the real depreciation will be attenuated in the case of shocks to ZH,t, relative to the case of
shocks to ZN,t.
5. Equilibrium under alternative speciﬁcations of the asset market
Inthissection, we analyzeour model under alternativespeciﬁcationsoftheassets market
by means of numerical exercises assuming ﬁnancial autarky, trade in nominal bonds, and trade
in nominal claims contingent on real and monetary shocks — i.e., claims to receiving one
unit of currency in each state of nature. We study the response of our economy to unexpected
nominal and real shocks, deﬁned as a 1 per cent deviation from their initial steady state values,
allowing for both permanent shocks and temporary shocks (lasting only one period). When
trade in assets is limited to bonds, it is well known that the effects of shocks on the wealth
distribution across countries will generate endogenous dynamics (see Obstfeld and Rogoff
[1996], Chapter 10). Thus, we solve for the equilibrium path assuming that after the shock the
economy evolves under perfect foresight to its new steady state, characterized by a different
world distribution of wealth.
In our exercises, we assume that labor is 4 times as productive in the tradable sector
relative to the nontradable sector – namely, we set
ZT
ZN =4 ; the values of η and θ are set
equal to 0.28 and 10, such that markups vary between 11 and 25 percent across sectors, and
the distribution margin is 50 percent— a number that is not far from available estimates for27
the US and other OECD countries (see Burstein, Neves and Rebelo [2000]). Tradables and
nontradables are given the same weight in consumption, i.e. γ = .5. Using the conditions
derived in the appendix, it can be veriﬁed that these parameters values ensure a unique steady
state.
The results of our exercises are shown in Table 2, which reports the percentage changes
in the nominal exchange rate (NER), the real exchange rate (RER), the terms of trade (TOT),
and real GDP (at constant steady-state prices) for the Home country under different asset
trading arrangements. Observe that, qualitatively, the equilibrium response to shocks in the
economies with trade in bonds are in line with our analysis in the previous section.
Relative to the economy with no assets trade, however, there are apparent quantitative
differences. Notably, there is a large drop in the exchange rate volatility between ﬁnancial
autarky and the bond economy. What explains such differences? In general, a shock increasing
the supply of Home tradables requires a worsening of the terms of trade to absorb the greater
relative abundance of the Home traded good. Not only is this due to a larger supply of Home
goods: it also reﬂects a shift of labor inputs in the Foreign country, out of the tradable sector
into the nontradable sector. Such a shift is necessary to take advantage of lower import prices
— more nontradables being demanded by retailers in the Foreign economy.
When a complete set of nominal contingent assets is available, perfect risk sharing calls
for the Home country to run a trade deﬁcit, as it is efﬁcient for the more productive country
to consume relatively more. In turn, this entails an increase in the Foreign labor supply and in
the production of Foreign tradables that in equilibrium greatly limit the relative abundance of
Home tradables and the movements in goods prices required to clear markets.
In the bond-only economy, the two countries can to some extent replicate the efﬁcient
risk sharing arrangement by having the Home country run a current accont deﬁcit and borrow
from abroad — thus limiting the relative supply of Home goods and containing in equilibrium
the decline in its terms of trade. In ﬁnancial autarky, instead, all trade has to be quid pro quo.
Relative to the bond economy, the Home country must thus export more and import less. But
highernet exports in equilibrium requirelarger movements in the terms oftradeandin nominal
and real exchange rates. With this intuitive explanation in mind, we now turn to discussing our
exercises in detail.28
5.1 Nominal and real exchange rate
Consider ﬁrst the response of the nominal exchange rate to monetary shocks (ﬁrst two
columns in Table 2). With incomplete markets, the NER is more volatile than the underlying
shock. A 1 percent temporary increase in µ — equivalent to a 1 percentage point drop in the
short-term nominal interest rate — depreciates E by 1.3 per cent in the bond economy, and
by a striking 8.8 per cent under ﬁnancial autarky. The same pattern of volatility emerges in
response to permanent monetary shocks.
25 Note that the result shown by (38) for the case
of ﬁnancial autarky carries over in our bond-only economy — although its size is relatively
contained in the presence of international borrowing and lending.







We should note here that the above solution also characterizes the exchange rate in our
incomplete-market economy in the limiting case η → 0 – when our speciﬁcation becomes
similar to Corsetti and Pesenti [2001a], Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000] and Devereux and Engel
[2000]. With constant demand elasticities (no distributive trade), nominal shocks cannot
produce any excess volatility. Furthermore, the exchange rate responds to real shocks in the
economy only through endogenous changes in the relative monetary policy stance µt/µ∗
t.
Without trade in contingent nominal bonds and η > 0, instead, real shocks to
productivity depreciate NER independently of monetary policy (third through sixth column
in the table). The magnitude of the effects of innovations to ZH and ZN on NER is comparable
(slightly lower in the case of shocks to ZN). In the bond economy, temporary productivity
shocks have a much smaller impact than permanent shocks (.2 percent vs. 3.9 percent), against
which bonds provide no insurance mechanism.
Finally, the real exchange rate is positively correlated with the nominal exchange rate
(so that it always weakens in response to positive nominal and real shocks), although relative
volatility depends on the nature of the underlying shock. Note that RER is less volatile than
25 In the bond economy, a temporary increase in µ decreases the domestic interest rate for one period. By the
uncovered interest parity, the domestic currency is expected to appreciate in the future, as the nominal exchange
rate returns to the initial steady state level. Following a permanent shock to µ, instead, the exchange rate displays
no endogenous dynamics. It immediately jumps to the new depreciated level and stays there. Recall that a
permanent shock to µimpliesconstant domesticandforeigninterest rates. ThepriceofHome goods will however
increase proportionally between the period in which the shock occurs, and the next.29
NER in response to nominal shocks and productivity shocks in the tradable goods sector; it is
as volatile or more volatile in response to shocks to the nontradable goods sector.
5.2 Terms of trade
In all our exercises, a nominal depreciation of the Home currency worsens the Home
terms of trade, regardless of the nature of the shock, raising the possibility of expenditure-
switching effects from exchange rate movements.
26 The terms of trade can be more volatile
than the nominal (and real) exchange rate or less volatile, again depending on the nature and
relative size of the shocks hitting the economy. For instance, whether or not agents can trade
international bonds, monetary shocks cause TOT to worsen by 30 percent less than NER.
Shocks in the nontradable sector have a small effect on the terms of trade. Conversely,
shocks to the tradable sector raise the volatility of the terms of trade above that of the nominal
(and real) exchange rate. Combining both shocks — i.e. allowing for an aggregate macro
shock to domestic productivity — relative volatility depends on how persistent the shock is
(see the last two columns of Table 2). Namely, permanent innovations cause the nominal
exchange rate to move more than the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. The opposite
pattern emerges in the case of temporary shocks.
5.3 Real GDP and price levels
In most exercises, exchange rate movements are several times larger than the average
changes in output. For instance, in response to permanent shocks to productivity, the nominal
and real exchange rates are between 5 and 20 times more volatile than real output, which, in
turn, is in general more volatile than consumption. So the model may be consistent with a high
volatility of the real exchange rate relative to real variables.
In general, domestic price movements tend to be quite limited with respect to those
in international prices, due to the low degree of pass-through that characterizes the model.
Changes in the domestic price level are in general a great deal smaller than changes in the
nominal exchange rate, particularly so in the face of nominal shocks: in this case, the CPI
response is ten times smaller than that of the nominal exchange rate.
27
26 In light of our discussion in the previous section, this is so because the ratio η/(θ − 1) is small in our
parameterization.
27 Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2002] carry out extensive quantitative analysis of the model, using more gen-
eral speciﬁcations of preferences and technology. Speciﬁcally, this paper is focused on the lack of international
risk sharing as exempliﬁed by the negative correlation of relative consumption and the real exchange rate – the
so-called Backus and Smith [1993] anomaly.Table 2: Impact Responses of Selected Variables to Nominal and Real Shocks under Alternative Asset Markets Structures
(Percentage deviations from steady-state values)
Monetary Shock Shock to Tradables Shock to Nontradables Economy-wide Shock
Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent
NER 8.8% 8.8% 3.9% 3.9% 3.7% 3.7% 7.7% 7.7%
RER 6.8% 6.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.7% 3.7% 6.8% 6.8%
Financial Autarky TOT 6.8% 6.8% 3.9% 3.9% 2.8% 2.8% 6.8% 6.8%
GDP 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9%
NER 1.3% 1.3% 0.2% 3.9% 0.2% 3.7% 0.3% 7.7%
RER 1.0% 1.0% 0.1% 3.0% 0.9% 3.7% 1.0% 6.8%
Bond economy TOT 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 3.9% 0.0% 2.8% 1.0% 6.8%
GDP 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9%
NER 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
RER 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
Complete Markets TOT 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% -0.1% -0.1% 0.8% 0.8%
GDP 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9%31
6. Monetary policy, international spillovers and gains from cooperation
Despite nominal wage rigidities, it is easy to show that in our economy there exists
a simple monetary rule that can sustain a ﬂex-price, ﬂex-wage allocation — obtained from
Table 1 by evaluating the optimal wage rates (27) and (28) without the expectation operator.












where Γt and Γ∗
t are deterministic functions of time (therefore known at time t − 1), scaling
the level of wages in the economy. Following the above rules monetary authorities tightens in
those states of the world when the disutility of working is higher. As monetary policy in either
country completely stabilizes the marginal disutility of working, according to (27) and (28)
workers will ﬁnd it optimal to set a nominal wage equal toΓtφ/(φ − 1) and Γ∗
tφ/(φ − 1).I ti s
easy to check that this is exactly the ﬂexible wage that would result when (44) is implemented.
It follows that the above monetary rules support the ﬂexible-wage allocation.
28
In a recent paper, Obstfeld and Rogoff [2002] argue that gains from international
monetary cooperation are small, once monetary authorities can credibly commit to self-
oriented policies of domestic stabilization, such as (44). In their model, there are no deviations
from the law of one price for tradable goods; moreover, in their benchmark economy, terms
of trade movements guarantees perfect risk sharing. Using our framework, we can show that
a similar result holds in an environment with deviations from the law of one price and low
pass-through to consumer prices, and less than optimal risk sharing. As in Obstfeld and
Rogoff [2002], we measure national welfare in terms of the expected utility of the national
representative agents, but abstracting from liquidity services (i.e. assuming χ → 0).
Consider the limiting case in which different brands of tradable goods are perfect
substitutes (θ →∞ ), so that, with competitive goods markets, ﬁrms are no longer able to
segment markets across national borders.
29 The law of one price holds at the producer price
level (this is apparent when evaluating expressions (17) and (18) as θ
θ−1 approaches unity).
28 This result shows that market segmentation due to distributive trade does not prevent the possibility that
monetary policy rules may sustain the allocation without nominal rigidities. As shown by Corsetti and Pesenti
[2001b], however, this is impossible when market segmentation and incomplete pass-through can be attributed to
local currency pricing (even partial local currency pricing) by ﬁrms.
29 The case of perfect competition in a small open economy without nominal rigidities is analyzed by
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo [2000].32
















































































































































When prices are measured net of distribution costs, it also holds at the consumer price level.
With perfectly competitivegoods markets, thesolution of themodel is considerably simpliﬁed.
For the case of ﬁnancial autarky, we are actually able to solve the model in closed form. The
allocation with perfect competition in the goods market and without trade in assets is shown
in Table 3.
The following proposition states that, with competitive goods markets, monetary
authorities can do no better than implementing (44) — even though under ﬁnancial autarky
the resulting allocation does not coincide with the command optimum.
30 Most crucially,
international cooperation is completely superﬂuous.
Proposition 1 Without trade in assets, if
θ
θ − 1
=1 , the monetary policy rule µt = Γt/κt —
as speciﬁed in (44) — is optimal in both the world Nash equilibrium and under cooperation
(independently of the welfare weights attributed to the Home and Foreign country).
30 See the working paper version of this paper for a detail characterization of the command optimum alloca-
tion (Corsetti and Dedola [2002]).33
To prove this proposition, we note that the ﬁrst order conditions of the policy problem in









κtµt − Et−1 (κtµt)
µt
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It is easy to check that the monetary rule µt = Γt/κt is a solution to the above equation for any
Foreign monetary policy stance µ∗
t. To prove the second part of the proposition, consider the
problem of a benevolent centralized planner, setting µt and µ∗
t to maximize a weighted average
of the expected utility of the Home and Foreign agents, according to arbitrary weights Ω and
1 − Ω :
Maxµt,µ∗
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It is apparent that setting µt according to (44) solves the above equation regardless of the value
of µ∗
t and Ω.
Intuitively, intheabsenceofﬁrms’ market power, themonetary authority in each country
can achieve a constrained Pareto-efﬁcient allocation by redressing the distortion from wage
stickiness. It cannot, however, address the distortion due to monopoly power in the labor
market, nor can it engineer enough risk sharing, as is required to achieve the command
optimum allocation.
Despite ﬁnancial and asset market frictions, a very high degree of competition in the
goods market implies that there are no monetary policy spillovers in equilibrium. However,
international spillovers are not zero, and the monetary rules (44) may not be optimal, when we
move away from this limiting case. In analogy to Obstfeld and Rogoff [2002], the question
is whether the magnitude of spillovers in the general version of our model is large enough to
motivate international policy coordination — an issue that we leave to future research.34
7. Conclusions
In the last few years, a vast and growing literature in international macroeconomics has
been devoted to the study of interdependence using general-equilibrium models with nominal
rigidities in either prices or wages. This literature has broken new ground in the analysis of
stabilization policies in an open-economy, improving our understanding of the international
transmission of both policy and real shocks.
Relative to the existing literature, this paper opens a new perspective to model the
macroeconomy and raises new issues. Several recent contributions stress the importance of
placing international price discrimination centerstage in the analysis of open economies. In
this paper we have shown that, among the alternative ways to do this, modelling vertical
relationships among ﬁrms located in different markets is a realistic and promising strategy,
bringing open macro theory more closely into line with key stylized facts of the international
economy related to large discrepancies in international prices.
Inourmodel,duetothepresenceofdownstreamretailers,upstreamﬁrmswithmonopoly
power may face different demand elasticities in national markets even under symmetric,
constant elasticity preferences across countries. Thus, they will optimally charge different
prices to domestic and foreign dealers — within the limits dictated by the possibility of
international arbitrage between wholesale and retail markets. As a consequence, the law
of one price fails to hold at both producer and consumer levels, independently of nominal
rigidities. Secondly, as ﬁrms optimally adjust markups in the face of demand ﬂuctuations,
the response of prices to exchange rate movements is muted at both consumer and producer
levels: exchange rate pass-through is not complete. Third, our model yields the result that
a depreciation of the currency generally worsens the terms of trade. Thus, despite low pass-
through the international transmission of monetary shocks can have expenditure-switching
effects. Fourth, our speciﬁcation accounts for the high volatility of the exchange rate relative
to consumption and output, whereas large changes in the nominal and real exchange rate are
associated with small changes in the real allocation and the consumer price level.
Key to our approach is that distributive trade requires local inputs; that is, that there are
vertical interactions among ﬁrms across national boundaries. It is worth stressing that vertical
interactions are not exclusively due to distributive trade. Realistically, local inputs can be
employed in some ﬁnal stage of manufacturing of the ﬁnal product at local level, combined
with traded intermediate goods. Encompassing both distributive trade and manufacturing at35
locallevel,theshareoftheconsumerpricesthatcanbeattributedtothecostoflocalinputsmay
actually become quite high, potentially reinforcing many of the novel results of our analysis.
The model in this paper has been purposely kept simple by means of convenient
assumptions. For instance, the elasticity of substitution among individual goods (brands) is
the same in all sectors, the elasticity of substitution among types of good is set equal to one,
and there is no difference between nontraded goods and distribution services. Relaxing these
assumptions is a key step to confront the model more directly with the data.
Most crucially, we have assumed the most basic vertical structure: an upstream
monopolist sells its product to a perfectly competitive downstream ﬁrm, the retailer. In this
case, without distortionary taxation at national level, vertical integration would be completely
neutral as regards the allocation. As we argued in section 3, allowing for monopoly power in
the retail sector would imply double marginalization at consumer prices. However, it would
notinducesubstantialdifferencesrelativeto ourresults ontheequilibriumresponseofpricesto
nominal and real shocks — there are no signiﬁcant losses in adopting our simpler benchmark
speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, an important task for future research is to generalize our setup to
richer strategic interactions between upstream and downstream ﬁrms (e.g., allowing for non-
linear pricing, or nominal rigidities in the goods market). bringing more realism – and more
insights from trade and industrial organization theory – into the construction of open macro
models.Appendix I
Firms’ pricing and the no-arbitrage conditions
This section of the Appendix studies the representative ﬁrm’s problem under the constraint
that prices should not provide opportunities for arbitrage. The (arbitrage-constrained) op-











































− pt(h) ≥ 0.
The relevant FOC’s for p(h) and p∗(h) (including the complementary slackness






































+ ξ2 = ξ1
ξ1 [p(h)+ηPN − Ep
∗(h)] = 0, p(h)+ηPN − Ep




N) − p(h)] = 0, E (p
∗(h)+ηP
∗
N) − p(h) ≥ 0, ξ2 ≥ 0.
Theoptimalprices discussed inthemain text are derivedforthecase in whichξ1 = ξ2 =0 .A n
important implication of these prices is that, if the Home monopolist can freely discriminate
across national markets, the same is true of the Foreign one. Before proceeding further, note
that if ξ1 ≥ 0, and ξ2 ≥ 0, then it must be that η(PN + EP∗
N)=0 , which can be true only for
η =0 . Obviously, as long as distribution costs are strictly positive, the two constraints cannot
be binding at the same time.
Thus, we can characterize optimal price-setting when either condition is binding.
Without loss of generality set ξ1 ≥ 0 and ξ2 =0 , i.e. p(h)+ηPN = Ep∗(h). The relevant37



























[p(h)+η (PN + EP ∗
N)]
θ = ξ1 ≥ 0.
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The optimality condition for P
∗
F mirrors the above expression.
Steady state characterization and multiplicity
In this section of the appendix, we show that our economy can have either a unique
or three steady states, depending on whether the exchange rate elasticity of Home export
expenditure is larger or smaller than the exchange rate elasticity of Home import expenditure,
both evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium with E =1— a condition reminiscent of the
Marshall-Lerner condition.
Consider a deterministic steady state in which external wealth is zero, i.e. BH = BF =0 ,
so that the trade balance is zero, and all exogenous variables are set equal to constant values,





















κ∗µ∗ =1 , the nominal exchange rate E is equal to 1, and the
consumption and labor allocation as determined by equations (32) and (34) are equal across
countries. Moreover, when the exchange-rate elasticity of import expenditure is larger than38
the exchange-rate elasticity of export expenditure in Home currency, both evaluated at the


























there will be two more steady-state equilibria in which
W
W∗ =1 , but the nominal exchange
rate is equal to Eh and El, respectively, where Eh > 1, and 0 < El < 1. The consumption and
labor allocations, as determined by equations (32) and (34), will differ across countries.
As the proof of this proposition is the same as the proof of multiple temporary equilibria
in a version of our economy with balanced trade and ﬂexible wages, in what follows we
write variables with time subscripts. Since the trade balance is identically equal to zero in


















or, using the expressions for PF,t, ¯ PF,t,P∗
























































, the equality above is
always satisﬁed for Et =1 . This establishes the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
In order to prove the second part, note that both the left-hand side and the right-hand
side of the above expression are nonlinear functions of Et.F o rEt =0 , the left-hand side term









> 0 (i.e., the value of the Home country imports is above the value of its
exports). Second, for Et →∞ , the left-hand side diverges, while the right hand side converges
to µt (i.e., Home country net exports are surely positive). Therefore, if the function of Et39
deﬁned by the left-hand side expression cuts the function deﬁned by the right-hand side one
at Et =1f r o ma b o v e—i . e .t h ed e r i v a t i v eo ft h eﬁrst function with respect to Et is smaller
in absolute value than the derivative of the second function both evaluated at Et =1 ,t h e nt h e
equilibrium condition is satisﬁed by two more values of the nominal exchange rate, El and Eh,
such that Eh > 1 > El > 0. This proves the second part of our proposition.
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≤ η ≤ (θ − 1)
(θ − 3) +
p
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By way of example, consider the case in which θ =1 0and the productivity level is identical
in the two sectors. In this case, the above condition is satisﬁed by 9
5 ≤ η ≤ 9
2.Appendix II: Solving the model
T h ep r o b l e mo ft h eH o m er e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e r
The Home agent j chooses a consumption plan, a portfolio plan and a wage rate, such
as to maximize utility (3) subject to the budget constraint (9) and total labor demand (76).
The ﬁrst order conditions of the Home consumer’s problem with respect to CH,t(j),
CF,t(j),C N,t(j),B H,t+1(j), BF,t+1 and Mt(j) are, respectively:
γ
CH,t (j)
=2 λt (j)PH,t (56)
γ
CF,t (j)
=2 λt (j)PF,t (57)
1 − γ
CN,t (j)
= λt (j)PN,t (58)














From these conditions, it is easy to see that, at the optimum, the individual demand for












U s i n gt h e s ee x p r e s s i o n s ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t
PtCt(j)=PH,tCH,t(j)+PF,tCF,t(j)+PN,tCN,t(j). (63)41
The intertemporal allocation of consumption is determined according to the Euler equation:
1
Ct(j)









































































It follows that the ﬂow budget constraint (9) is:
it+1Mt(j)
1+it+1
+ Et {Qt,t+1(j)At+1(j)} ≤ At(j)+Rt(j) − Tt(j) − PtCt(j) (71)42
where At+1 is wealth (net assets) at the beginning of period t +1 ,d e ﬁned as:
At+1(j) ≡ Mt(j)+( 1+it+1)BH,t+1(j)+( 1+i
∗
t+1)Et+1BF,t+1(j). (72)
Optimization implies that households exhaust their intertemporal budget constraint: the
ﬂow budget constraint hold as equality and the transversality condition below is satisﬁed:
lim
N→∞
Et [Qt,N(j)AN(j)] = 0 (73)
where Qt,N ≡
QN
s=t+1 Qs−1,s. If an interior solution exists (as is the case given
our parameterization), the resource constraint holds as equality as well. Similar results
characterize the optimization problem of Foreign agent j∗.
Wage setting
Consider now the problem of choosing an optimal nominal wage rate one period in


















Using the fact that φ is the same across sectors, the total demand for the labor input supplied

















Workers are assumed to be monopolistic suppliers of a particular type of labor; thus, they take
into account the above demand schedule when ﬁxing the nominal wage rate. We posit that the
number of workers is large enough so that they ignore the impact of their own pricing decision
on the aggregate wage index. As in Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000a], the ﬁrst order condition for43










With a competitive labor market, the nominal wage rate equates the disutility of labor to the
marginal utility of consumption of an additional unit of nominal revenue. Because of workers’
monopoly power, the wage rate is set with a markup φ/(φ − 1) over the expected utility cost
of labor effort, expressed in units of domestic currency. Having set the wage rate optimally,
workers stand ready to provide any amount of labor to ﬁrms at the going rate, as long as the
real wage is above the marginal disutility of labor. We restrict the size of shocks in such a way
that this will always be the case.
The current account
We focus on an equilibrium in which domestic agents are symmetric within a country
(although there could be asymmetries across countries). Aggregating the individual budget






= At + Rt − PtCt (78)
where A is deﬁned as wealth net of money balances, or
At+1 ≡ At+1 − Mt. (79)
Now, Rt is deﬁned as:
Rt ≡
¡ ¯ PH,t + ηPN,t
¢







































































































Clearly, in equilibrium At = −EtA
∗
t, for all t.References
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